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Despite the increasing move to community care,
general practitioners sensing that the traditional gate-
keeper role is being eroded by other pre-hospital and
community health professionals, assailed by private
organisations and now even under threat from the
acute sector have staked their claim to the central
ground of providing interpersonal care, dealing with
uncertainty and managing diagnostic complexity.2
As every general practitioner and ‘House’ aﬁcionado
knows,3 diagnosis has always been the most challen-
ging, interesting and diﬃcult aspect of our work,
presenting, as it does, many pitfalls and much poten-
tial for error.
It is becoming increasingly clear that an eﬀective
approach to preventing errors needs to embrace indi-
vidual cognitive errors as well as faults in systems.4 In
one analysis of diagnostic errors in internal medicine,
46% were found to be due to both system and cog-
nitive error; system causes alone accounted for 19%
whereas cognitive factors were evident in 28%. System
factors weremainly organisational (policy, procedure,
processes, teamwork, communication etc) rather than
technical or equipment failure. Most importantly, cog-
nitive factors, described in more detail below, were
more frequent than system factors.5
Is there any evidence that the process of thinking
about thinking, termed ‘metacognition’, can improve
the diagnostic process and reduce diagnostic error?
The human information processing system, which
has been subjected to almost a century of published
research, demonstrates some key features that help
us to understand medical decision making. Whereas
long-termmemory is inﬁnite, short-termmemory can
only hold a few pieces of information (approximating
to seven, close to the number of digits in a telephone
number), and the time taken to transfer the latter to
the former ranges from seconds to minutes. Despite
the limitations of short-term memory the human
mind can solve complex problems. Research also shows
that the pattern of information processing varies with
the structure of the task and the problem solver.
Elstein and co-workers’ early studies on the diag-
nostic process found that it involved four stages: data
or cue acquisition (from history, examination and
investigation) based on knowledge, data evaluation,
hypothesis generation and hypothesis evaluation or
judgement. Hypotheses were generated early in the
diagnostic process, few hypotheses were retained at a
time (usually only seven or so), and practitioners were
reluctant to generate new or multiple hypotheses
because of an inherent tendency to limit complexity.
Recent research has shown that experienced doctors
solve familiar problems by using pattern recognition
and recall based on speciﬁc examples from previous
experience or case prototypes built up from learning.6
Other strategies include heuristics (‘rules of thumb’),7
and ruling out worst case scenarios which enable
doctors to take shortcuts in routine or critical deci-
sions respectively. Cognitive errors, due to failure in
the hypothetico-deductive process in the study de-
scribed previously were most often due to hypothesis
generation and hypothesis evaluation, less often due
to faulty data gathering and least often due to faulty
knowledge.5 Cognitive biases, failed heuristics and
cognitive dispositions to respond in a particular way
are also sources of cognitive error which are hard
wired into the human information-processing system.
Over 30 diﬀerent types of cognitive error found in
emergency settings have been described in detail.8 The
commonest sequence of errors is anchoring (ﬁxing on
a mistaken diagnosis too early), ignoring new infor-
mation, and coming to a conclusion too early, so-called
premature closure. It could be argued therefore, that
cognitive errors are a special subset of system errors,
errors built into the system of human information
processing.
A case study in general practicemight help illustrate
the problem. A young female patient, in her early
30s presented with upper abdominal pain. She was
commenced on antacids with initial improvement.
A ‘diagnosis’ of reﬂux quickly led in succession to an
H2 blocker and then a proton pump inhibitor (PPI).
During these initial consultations, and after, she did
not experience relief of her symptoms despite a PPI,
she became anxious and depressed and acquired a
further diagnosis of irritable bowel syndrome aswell as
reﬂux. This led to a prescription for an antidepressant
(serotonin reuptake inhibitor) and antispasmodic in
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addition to her PPI. She then also developed vaginal
discharge. At this point, within six weeks of her
original presentation she was consulting various gen-
eral practitioners in the practice every 2–3 days. Her
case was discussed at a practice meeting when it was
even suggested that she should be asked to ﬁnd another
practice, because shewas ‘misusing’ the service. Fortu-
nately, common sense prevailed and she was assigned
to one general practitioner who would try and unravel
the problem. Blood tests were normal. Vaginal swabs
conﬁrmed Trichomonas vaginalis, which was eﬀectively
treatedwithmetronidazole. An abdominal ultrasound
revealed gallstones. Her fear dissipated when she
understood the problem, began a fat-free diet and
subsequently had a successful laparascopic chole-
cystectomy.
This example demonstrates ‘anchoring’, ‘prema-
ture closure’ (ﬁxing to the diagnosis of reﬂux and
completing the diagnostic process too early) and
‘psych-out error’ (psychological symptoms adversely
aﬀecting the diagnostic process),8 as well as errors
described by Klein.9 Just as system ﬂaws, described by
the ‘Swiss cheese’ model,4 can be analysed with root
cause analysis and addressed through introduction
of speciﬁc defences, barriers and safeguards,10 cogni-
tive errors can be corrected through metacognition
(thinking about thought processes) and mental strat-
egies, termed cognitive ‘forcing functions’. A ‘forcing
function’ is simply a mental strategy devised to pre-
vent such errors.11,12 Experienced doctors often use
such strategies. For example, in cases of rectal bleeding
we are taught that a digital rectal examination is
mandatory, ‘if you don’t put your ﬁnger in it, you’ll
put your foot in it’. When prescribing drugs, particu-
larly antibiotics, good doctors always ask about aller-
gies. To prevent premature closure, clinicians should
keep an open mind about the diagnostic possibilities
and ensure that a working diagnosis does not inad-
vertently become a deﬁnitive diagnosis.
In his seminal work,The Inner Consultation, Neigh-
bour describes a technique to improve consultations
by imagining observing one’s own consultations in
real time.13 This self-imposed ‘out of body experi-
ence’, leads from an initial sense of depersonalisation,
similar to the initial experience of consulting with a
camera running, to a potential tool for reﬁning not
only the communication but also the analytical pro-
cesses of the consultation. Increasing education for
metacognition,14 and application of appropriate cog-
nitive forcing strategies may arguably prove to be as
important as a systems approach in future error
management.15
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